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Climate Change and Our Political Future 
 
Harry van der Linden 
Under Review: 
Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright. Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our Planetary 
Future.  Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2018. Pp. xiii + 207. $26.95, hardcover. ISBN 978178663429-0. 
 
This book addresses two important and urgent questions:  what might happen politically as 
climate change increasingly takes hold, and how should the Left respond to the anticipated new 
political conditions? Mann and Wainwright write that their discussion of our political future as 
shaped by a worsening climate change is guided by four “core propositions.”  The first two are 
not controversial among people committed to climate justice: the science of climate change as 
such need not be debated (which does not preclude the need for further scientific analysis) and 
the impact of rapid climate change is horrible and a threat to human life, especially for the poor 
and marginalized. The third proposition is that it is unlikely that we can avoid significant climate 
change and so “the time has come for an analysis that anticipates (even as it fights against) a 
rapidly warming world” (13).  The fourth proposition is that, since the elites of global capitalism 
have failed to coordinate a response to the deterioration of the climate that will increasingly 
jeopardize their political and economic power, we must expect that “elites will increasingly 
attempt to coordinate their reactions, all while sailing seas of uncertainty and incredulity” (14).  
 In support of the third proposition, Mann and Wainwright point to overall growing global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, continual record warm years, the Paris Agreement with 
nations failing to set individual mitigation goals that will keep global warming within the 
proclaimed target goal of 2 (or even 1.5) degrees Celsius, and the withdrawal of the United 
States from this Agreement. They also observe that continuous accumulation is essential to 
capitalism; that fossil-fuel extraction has become more energy- and carbon- intensive, as 
exemplified by fracking and tar sands oil (25-26); and that adapting to climate change may make 
it worse. The authors  point to the growing demand for air conditioning, especially in  the 
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expanding and warming cities of the developing world, as an adaptation “that begets greater 
future suffering” since it increases fossil fuel-based electricity use and adds to the “urban heat 
island effect” (60).1   
But Mann and Wainwright reject the despairing response that “we are doomed.”  We 
must instead keep on fighting for mitigation and examine how political institutions and practices 
may be transformed in light of climate change. The fourth proposition hints at what they think is 
the likely political future: in response to growing climate disruptions, the global capitalist elites 
will create a “planetary sovereignty,” constituted as an emergency, a state of exception, for the 
sake of security and defense of human life. The planetary sovereignty will involve a central 
authority capable of a forceful management of mitigation and adaptation on a global scale. The 
authors call this capitalist response to climate change “Climate Leviathan,” and draw from 
Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt to articulate it. On the basis of the dichotomies “capitalist” and 
non-capitalist” and “planetary sovereignty and “anti-planetary sovereignty,” Mann and 
Wainwright consider three other possible future political formations (or ideal types): “Climate 
Behemoth” (capitalist and anti-planetary sovereignty), “Climate Mao” (non-capitalist and 
planetary sovereignty), and “Climate X” (non-capitalist and anti-planetary sovereignty).  
Climate Behemoth will emerge if some combination of fossil-fuel capitalists, market 
fundamentalists, climate change deniers, right-wing nationalists and populists, and millenarians 
who welcome a climate apocalypse triumphs in the long run.  Wainwright and Mann say little 
about the political consequences of Climate Behemoth – they hint at fascism and plutocracy (47) 
– and view it mainly as an oppositional force to Climate Leviathan that they believe is bound to 
fail. As an oppositional force, Behemoth evokes what Naomi Klein describes as disaster 
capitalism, using “shock” to dismantle public services and promote de-regulated capitalism.2 
                                                          
1
 An additional problem is that air conditioning uses HFC refrigerants, which are extremely 
harmful GHGs. The Kigali Amendment, adopted by the signatories of the (ozone-layer 
protecting) Montreal Protocol in 2016, and taking effect on January 1, 2019, stipulates an almost 
complete phase-out of HFCs but allows three decades for the gradual accomplishment of this 
goal.   
2
 The aftermath of hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico is instructive in this regard and discussed in 
Klein, The Battle for Paradise, 43-53. Mann and Wainwright seem to mischaracterize as “a 
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Climate Mao agrees with Climate Leviathan about the necessity of planetary sovereignty, but 
views capitalism as incapable of addressing climate change. It may come about when the people 
of China revolt against a Communist Party unable to sustain their material gains due to 
worsening climate change and then create an authoritarian state socialism that focuses on climate 
mitigation and adaptation. Wainwright and Mann opt for the designation “Climate Mao” because 
they argue that only China as the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter could lead other 
countries, especially in the South, to support socialist global climate management. The capitalist 
North will resist, possibly triggering a global war between Mao and Leviathan (49). However, it 
is more likely that China will continue on its current state-capitalist path and support the 
capitalist climate management of Climate Leviathan. Finally, Climate X is the response of the 
non-authoritarian Left:  it rejects the authoritarian climate management of both Climate Mao and 
Climate Leviathan and avoids the injustice of Climate Behemoth that makes the poor and 
marginalized the greatest victims of climate disaster. The final chapter of Climate Leviathan 
discusses Climate X, while Climate Leviathan is emphasized in most other chapters.  
Extrapolating from Hobbes’ Leviathan as a response to the threat of civil war to the need 
for global sovereignty in response to the threat of climate change and adding Schmitt’s 
characterization of sovereignty leads to Climate Leviathan.  Another theoretical avenue to 
Climate Leviathan is “green Keynesianism,” but one that, due to the borderless nature of climate 
change and the globalized economy, would transcend the level of the state and become a 
“planetary green Keynesianism” (126). This type of Keynesianism requires a global coordination 
center, i.e., Climate Leviathan.  Finally, Bertrand Russell and Alfred Einstein, among others, 
argued that the threat of global annihilation posed by nuclear weapons necessitates a world 
government that could create a non-nuclear regime.  The threat of climate catastrophe points in 
the same political direction (140 ff). Granted these “logics” toward planetary sovereignty, how 
might this sovereignty come about in political reality? 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
metaphor for Climate Leviathan” that hurricane Sandy left Manhattan in darkness with the 
headquarters of Goldman Sachs ablaze in light thanks to their generators (157).  Behemoth 
leaves individuals to fend for themselves and those with little means end up “in darkness.” The 
regulated capitalism of Climate Leviathan involves collective measures against climate change, 
benefitting mostly (but not only) the rich.   
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Mann and Wainwright sketch two ways Climate Leviathan might emerge.   First,  “elites 
mainly from two leading capitalist states, the United States and China, are capable of 
reconfiguring the political so that sovereignty is organized and legitimated on a planetary basis” 
(145). Mann and Wainwright make conflicting suggestions as to how coercive this sovereignty 
would be. They write that this “elite program … might be granted substantial legitimacy in a 
context of perceived planetary emergency” (145).  But they also claim that “planetary 
governance would enroll on a lumpy, conflictual terrain” (152) since the input of most states is 
excluded and there is not one hegemonic power but rather a “G2” (the United States and China). 
In passing, Mann and Wainwright mention that India and Russia might have to be included in 
global climate governance (31, 152) and this would add to hegemonic struggle.  The second way  
definitely implies coercion and conflict, since it has the United States obtaining total dominance 
in the development of space weapons, and then “space weapons will be mobilized to defend life 
on Earth: atmospheric geoengineering” (148). In a word, planetary sovereignty here includes the 
monopoly of space violence, enabling the United States to control through injection of synthetic 
aerosols how much sunlight is reflected back into space. This control requires the threat or use of 
violence in light of the controversial nature of geoengineering and its divergent impact on 
different regions on earth.  
Mann and Wainwright suggest that the “G2” could use “the United Nations or other 
international fora … as a means of legitimizing aggressive means of surveillance and discipline” 
(32), adding in a footnote that the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2011 considered the task of 
managing climate-induced conflict. This suggestion deserves elaboration since it points to an 
important possible scenario leading to Climate Leviathan. The UNSC has on several occasions 
debated whether climate change is a Security Council issue, partly under pressure of small island 
states who view the rising sea levels caused by climate change as a threat to their sovereignty 
and survival. More broadly, climate change may be viewed as an UNSC issue because it is a 
“threat multiplier,” meaning that climate refugees, reduced resources due to global warming, 
shrinking agricultural land, and the like add to existing or evolving conflicts.  A case can be 
made that the UNSC has the authority to take Chapter VII (“coercive”) measures regarding GHG 
mitigation and adaption to climate change.  But most countries from the Global South have 
opposed making climate change an UNSC issue in any form, presumably being wary of 
“Western interventionism,” while the many supporting countries of the North have typically 
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favored some non-coercive UNSC role.
3
  However, if the Paris Agreement falls apart and more 
severe climate disruptions arise, this opposition might end, and so move us closer to the Climate 
Leviathan of “G2,” assuming that China and the United States would dominate UNSC 
decisions.
4
  
 Mann and Wainwright oppose progressive supporters of the Paris Agreement in the name 
of Climate X.   For them the Agreement rests on a misguided belief in “green capitalism” and 
further involves a mistaken acceptance of state-centered solutions of climate change, thus 
foreshadowing Climate Leviathan.  Climate X is anti-capitalist and rejects planetary sovereignty. 
Its main proponents are the Marxist Left and anti-colonial indigenous groups whose lifestyle 
prefigures how true green living must evolve. Climate X requires cooperation between the two 
groups, and radical climate activists engaged in blocking fossil-fuel developments and promoting 
divestment and boycotts offer a glimpse of this social formation (197). However, we cannot 
predict X’s institutional form: “We might expect it to emerge as a ragtag collection of the many, 
but cannot say anything definitive.  X, after all, is variable” (193).  Climate X follows three 
principles.  It views people as equal, sharing the Earth; it emphasizes the dignity and voice of all 
(radical democracy); and it is guided by solidarity among divergent green communities and 
modes of life, offering multiplicity instead of global sovereignty.   
The conception of Climate X is problematic on several grounds. First, it seems to 
discourage cooperation with liberal or progressive supporters of the Paris Agreement since the 
Agreement is seen as foreshadowing Climate Leviathan. Granted, green capitalism might not be 
able to deal effectively with climate change in the long run (though this can be debated), and it 
will surely be unjust in the  sharing of the burdens and benefits of mitigation and adaption.  Still, 
we should support the Paris Agreement and similar initiatives (while pointing out their 
shortcomings) because they provide some room for anti-capitalist alternatives to grow before 
climate disruptions may lead to authoritarian global climate management. Second, socialism as a 
convincing response to climate change needs to be given more specific institutional content. For 
example, we need to address how workplace democracy might be conducive to greener 
                                                          
3
 See Cousins, “UN Security Council,” 201-10. 
4
 For some objections to the UNSC enforcing carbon mitigation, see my “Climate Change 
Mitigation and the U.N. Security Council.”   
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production or how community input in investments might be conducive to greener transportation 
or electricity generation. To be sure, there are limits to envisioning a green socialist future (the 
authors emphasize the Marxian views that our historical location restricts our vision), but the 
struggle for this future minimally requires a discussion of concrete steps in this direction. Finally, 
Mann and Wainwright adhere to a conception of sovereignty that seems to preclude any 
significant role for the state and international or global institutions in creating climate justice. 
The weaknesses of the Paris Agreement, including the compliance problem of UNCFFF as the 
institutional basis of this Agreement, may in fact call forth Climate Leviathan, since the window 
of preventing climate disaster is small.  But this does not mean that in the struggle to prevent this 
scenario we should not theorize and seek to materialize more democratic and effective forms of 
national, regional, and global climate governance. Our best hope may lie between Mao and X.  
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